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Trading volumeAlthough the beneﬁts of auditing are uncontroversial in developed markets,
there is scant evidence about its eﬀect in emerging economies. Auditing derives
its value by increasing the credibility of ﬁnancial statements, which in turn
increases investors’ reliance on them in developed markets. Financial state-
ment information is common to all investors and therefore increased reliance
on it should reduce divergence in investors’ assessment of ﬁrm value. We exam-
ine the eﬀect of interim auditing on inter-investor divergence with a large sam-
ple of listed Chinese ﬁrms and ﬁnd that it decreases more for ﬁrms whose
reports are audited compared to non-audited ﬁrms. This ﬁnding suggests that
investors rely more on audited ﬁnancial information. Results of this study are
robust to variations in event window length and speciﬁcation of empirical
measures.
 2014 SunYat-senUniversity. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is
an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Global competition for scarce ﬁnancial resources has made it important for emerging economies to
stimulate the investment environment by improving the information that is available to ordinary investors.
Emerging economies like China have responded by undertaking two approaches to reducing the divergence
between sophisticated and other investors both in the public information made available to all investors
and making it easier for the public to invest: improving market and legal institutions; and regulating auditing
and related institutions to improve the credibility of ﬁnancial statements. China set up the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges in the early 1990’s and undertook major legal and market reforms in 1992. On
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practice in China in 1992, established legal penalties for violating audit standards in 1992, promulgated the
ﬁrst set of independent auditing standards in 1995, made audit ﬁrms independent of local governments in
2000, made auditors responsible for damages suﬀered by investors from audit negligence from1 2005 and
adopted international accounting and auditing standards in 2007. Similar measures have been adopted by
other developing economies.
Improving the reliability of ﬁnancial statements by better auditing is beneﬁcial to ordinary investors only if
such improvement makes a discernible diﬀerence in asset pricing. Otherwise, the demand for auditing will col-
lapse and even if auditing is mandatory, audit quality will race to the bottom. While the beneﬁcial eﬀects of
auditing in developed economies where investors are sophisticated and auditors face high legal and reputation
costs are widely recognized (see US based evidence such as in Brown and Pinello, 2007), there is little evidence2
that auditing beneﬁts investors in emerging economies with less developed markets.
From a policy perspective, for developing economies that face competing demands for scarce resources, it is
not clear whether establishing auditing as an independent institution3 prior to establishing eﬀective legal and
market institutions4 will lead to a lower divergence between investors and greater conﬁdence among ordinary
investors. A resolution of this issue demands the collection of systematic evidence on the eﬀect of auditing in
emerging markets. Such evidence is scarce. This paper provides evidence supporting the beneﬁcial eﬀects of
auditing in an emerging economy.
Financial statement information aﬀects stock prices in two ways. The ﬁrst is the price eﬀect. Beaver (1968)
points out that price changes in response to earnings announcements reﬂect the average change in traders’
beliefs. However, the average hides diﬀerential reactions between traders who rely solely on public information
and sophisticated investors who develop private information in anticipation of the earnings announcement
(Kim and Verrecchia, 1997). This divergence between investors is captured by stock return variability and
trading volume (Callen, forthcoming; Beaver, 1968). A complete analysis of the eﬀect of auditing calls for
an examination of inter-investor divergence5 in addition to average price changes. We argue that a reduction
in inter-investor divergence – a more level playing ﬁeld – creates greater conﬁdence among ordinary investors
and creates an environment that stimulates investment.
Haw et al. (2008) examines the price eﬀect of auditing in China using a window of opportunity in which
numerous listed Chinese ﬁrms had their semi-annual statements voluntarily audited by external auditors
(annual audits are mandatory). They show that earnings response coeﬃcients (ERC) of audited ﬁrms are higher
than those for non-audited ﬁrms. In contrast, we investigate the eﬀect of auditing on inter-investor divergence,
using two measures: variability of risk-adjusted abnormal stock returns and trading volume. This approach dif-
fers from the ERC approach in three important ways. First, it captures the diﬀerential eﬀects of auditing
whereas ERC captures the average eﬀect. Second, returns variability and trading volume encompass the overall1 The Act about the Acceptance of Tort Cases Caused by Fraudulent Financial Reporting in Security Market enacted by the Chinese
Supreme Court in 2002 deﬁned individual auditor’s liability for damages to investors for undetected material misstatements and the Act of
Security, passed in 2005 mandates that auditors be held liable for damages to investors.
2 Chinese and other emerging markets exhibit some market tensions because of weak country-level governance, weak legal and extra-
legal institutions and political economy variables (Craig, 2005; Leahy, 2004) that might reduce the overall reliability of ﬁnancial statements
(LaPorta et al., 1998; Haw et al., 2004; Dyck and Zingales, 2004). A strand of recent literature, however, has addressed the diﬀerential
eﬀect of auditing on the reliability of ﬁnancial statements and suggests that auditing substitutes for weakness in the institutional variables
mentioned above (Srinidhi et al., 2008; Choi et al., forthcoming). The results of this study are consistent with the argument that the eﬀect
of auditing in these emerging markets is in fact, stronger than in the more developed markets.
3 Establishing the audit institution and making it eﬀective is costly. The cost includes the costs of training and certifying competent
auditors and setting up a structure in which they can provide independent opinions in addition to the cost incurred by all listed ﬁrms in
getting their ﬁnancial statements audited.
4 The issue is NOT whether auditing should be promoted at all. The issue is the sequence in which reforms are undertaken. If auditing
has a direct eﬀect on asset pricing even when the legal and market institutions are weak, a reform of the auditing institutions should be
undertaken early in the sequence of reforms. On the other hand, if auditing is only eﬀective in a sophisticated market with strong legal and
market institutions, audit reform is best undertaken after building those institutions.
5 We use the term “inter-investor divergence” instead of “information asymmetry” in this paper to denote inter-investor diﬀerences in
information, because the term “information asymmetry” has the connotation of information diﬀerences between managers and investors,
which is not the focus of this study.
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earnings only. Third, tests of variability do not rely upon an expected interim earnings model which is diﬃcult
to model, given that neither audited annual reports nor non-audited interim reports of the last year provide a
justiﬁable proxy for expected interim earnings.
The variability of risk-adjusted stock returns has been shown to reﬂect divergence between informed and
uninformed investors (Roll, 1988;Morck et al., 2000;Durnev et al., 2003; Ferreira andLaux, 2007). In particular,
a select group of privately informed investors increase their return by buying (selling) securities when informa-
tion is positive (negative) and participating in the options and futuresmarkets. On the other hand,most investors
depend on public ﬁnancial information for their trades. Auditing should reduce this divergence if the
market allows ordinary investors to beneﬁt from the quality improvement in public ﬁnancial information.
The use of trading volume as our second measure of inter-investor divergence is also supported by a number
of studies. Kim and Verrecchia (1991) use a two-period rational expectations model and show that the expected
trading volume is positively associated with information divergence. Atiase and Bamber (1994) and Lobo and
Tung (1997) provide empirical evidence that trading volume is associated with information divergence.
Investors aggregate ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial information available to them in pricing stocks. The ﬁnd-
ings of Banker and Datar (1989) suggest that investors could beneﬁt from improved audited ﬁnancial infor-
mation quality if they correspondingly increase the weight they place on ﬁnancial information and reduce the
weight on other information. Using a similar Bayesian theory-based reasoning, Yeung (2009) argues that
greater uncertainty in ex-ante earnings results in investors putting a greater weight on reported earnings.
Financial statement information is available to all investors at the same time whereas other information could
vary both across investors and in the time at which it becomes available to diﬀerent investors. Higher weight-
ing of common information reduces inter-investor divergence. Moreover, ﬁnancial statement information
(semi-annual) is released less frequently than other public and private information into the market. A higher
weighting of the less frequent ﬁnancial information also contributes to reduction in variability. At the extreme,
if accounting information is the only information available for pricing the stock, the stock price would change
only twice in a year, reducing the price variability to nearly zero (except around the earnings announcement
times). It is the more frequent and cross-sectionally variant non-accounting information that contributes to
stock price variability on a daily basis. Stock price variability will be reduced if non-accounting information
is weighted less.
However, more informative announcements could increase the variability in stock returns temporarily after
the announcement because of the diﬀerence between the announced information and prior investor beliefs.
This diﬀerence will also be sharper and more pronounced for audited earnings announcements that are more
accurate. Therefore, we expect a temporary increase in the variability of stock returns (or trading volume) fol-
lowed by a more permanent decrease after earnings announcements for audited ﬁrms compared to non-
audited ﬁrms. Consistent with our expectation, we ﬁnd that subsequent to the announcement of semi-annual
reports both the variability of stock returns and trading volumes are higher for a short period of two days
between t = 0 and t = 1 and are then signiﬁcantly smaller for the group of audited observations compared
to the group of non-audited ones.6 In eﬀect, these ﬁndings show that audited ﬁnancial information decreases
inter-investor divergence more than non-audited information.
Our study contributes to the literature by showing that auditing of ﬁnancial statements has the discernible
eﬀect of reducing inter-investor divergence even in an emerging economy such as China. In eﬀect, the policy
makers in emerging economies are justiﬁed in investing resources in auditing and seeking improvements in
ﬁnancial statement quality. In contrast to a mandatory annual audit context, this study exploits a context that
allows us to directly compare diﬀerences between the eﬀects of voluntarily audited and non-audited interim
ﬁnancial statements. Furthermore, this study also complements the average price level eﬀects of auditing
found by Haw et al. (2008).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the background and literature
review; Section 3 develops the theory for the proposition that auditing aﬀects the variability of stock returns6 The bid-ask-spread which is a common measure of inter-investor information divergence is not available in the Chinese market
context. In a sensitivity test, we ﬁnd that the daily high-low spread is signiﬁcantly lower for audited ﬁrms (not tabulated).
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method and empirical results; ﬁnally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Background and literature review
2.1. Context of the study: semi-annual auditing in China
Chinese regulation requires mandatory audit of annual ﬁnancial statements for all listed ﬁrms. Further, it
also mandates the audit of interim semi-annual statements for ﬁrms with poor performance records or weak
ﬁnancial positions, as well as for ﬁrms that plan to issue rights oﬀerings or pay dividends in the second half of
the year. Other ﬁrms can have their semi-annual reports audited voluntarily.7 Nevertheless, in the period
between 1997 and 2000, over seventy percent of ﬁrms that did not require to be audited got their interim state-
ments voluntarily audited. We note here three implications of voluntary audits for our study. The eﬀects of
semi-annual audits could be attenuated by annual audits via ex-post settling up of accounts, making them less
detectable. By implication, an empirical detection of reduced information divergence in this setting shows that
auditing of semi-annual reports has an eﬀect beyond the dilutive eﬀects of ex-post settling by annual audits.
Second, auditors with whom we held follow-up interviews told us that the scope, reporting requirements and
audit procedures they employed in semi-annual audits were substantially similar to those used in annual
audits, which makes our results generalizable to annual audits. Third, some ﬁrms might systematically self-
select to be voluntarily audited. We have taken many steps in this study to control for self-selection, such
as Heckman (1976) correction, two-stage regression and change-model speciﬁcation.
2.2. Related work
Two strands of literature are relevant to this study. The ﬁrst one examines the eﬀect of auditing in the US.
While studies on direct comparison of audited and non-audited reports are scarce, several of these studies
examine the eﬀect of audit quality diﬀerences on ﬁnancial statements. The second strand of literature is on
the audit structure in China that provides an understanding of why some ﬁrms voluntarily choose to be
audited and others do not. This helps us in developing controls for self-selection bias.
Chow (1982) takes advantage of a historical regulation in the US in 1926, prior to securities laws, when exter-
nal audit was optional in public ﬁrms. He studied the characteristics of ﬁrms that voluntarily chose to have their
ﬁnancial statements audited, but did not examine the diﬀerences between audited and non-audited ﬁnancial
statements. Other papers examine voluntary uses of auditor expertise in ﬁrms that were notmandated to get their
statements audited. For example, Givoly et al. (1978) focus on the audit review function (not mandated) and
examine auditor-reviewed and non-reviewed ﬁrms. Their conclusions were not deﬁnitive due to small sample
and data limitations. In a follow-up study, Alford and Edmonds (1981) replicated Givoly et al. (1978) and found
similar results. As the scope and procedures applicable to reviews are substantially diﬀerent from those of annual
audits, the results from these studies cannot be generalized to other auditing contexts.
Several other studies have examined the eﬀect of audit quality on ﬁnancial reporting by using research
designs other than direct comparison. Becker et al. (1998) show that the Big 6 auditors constrain earnings
management. Teoh and Wong (1993), Choi and Jeter (1992) and Loudder et al. (1992) show that earnings
of ﬁrms that are audited by large auditors exhibit higher stock return responses to earnings. These studies have
focused on the eﬀect of audit quality (typically proxied by auditor size) on earnings management and stock
returns and have found that higher quality audits improve the reliability of ﬁnancial statements.
The Chinese stock market has attracted increasing attention from accounting and auditing researchers.
Chen et al. (1999) provide a descriptive analysis of the auditing requirements and environment in China.
DeFond et al. (2000) present evidence that the frequency of modiﬁed audit opinions (MAOs) increased
signiﬁcantly after the adoption of the auditing standards in 1995, which was immediately followed by “ﬂight7 In general, voluntary auditing of semi-annual statements in China and quarterly statements in the US is not forbidden. However, our
setting is diﬀerent as some ﬁrms are required to have their semi-annual statements audited. This sensitizes investors and ﬁrms to the
possibility and beneﬁts of a semi-annual audit.
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audit opinions in China. Chen et al. (2001) ﬁnd that auditors are more likely to issue MAOs for regulation-
induced earnings management. Haw et al. (2003) show that the timeliness of ﬁnancial reporting is negatively
associated with modiﬁed audit opinions. These ﬁndings document the institutional background in which our
study is conducted.
2.3. Voluntary semi-annual audits in China
The reason as to why a majority of ﬁrms voluntarily undertake semi-annual audits is particularly intriguing
in China because the fees for semi-annual auditing, based on our investigations with local audit ﬁrms, typically
are 30–50% of annual audit fees. Moreover, the audit could lead to an unfavorable audit opinion that could
impact managerial reputation and increase regulatory scrutiny. For the ﬁrms that voluntarily get their semi-
annual statements audited, the expected beneﬁts of auditing should be higher than the above-mentioned costs.
We conducted several interviews with audit partners and managers of listed companies to identify factors
that motivated them to choose voluntary semi-annual audits. Some ﬁrms wanted to improve their market
image (signaling), which in turn could help in their future share issuance or business negotiations, such as
those for strategic alliances or joint ventures. Managers of a Shanghai company told us, for example, that they
were negotiating a joint venture with a multinational company and believed that a voluntary audit would
make their company more transparent and attractive to the potential partner. Some ﬁrms chose semi-annual
audits with a view to making annual audits less time consuming and more manageable. As each listed ﬁrm is
assigned a date by the Stock Exchange for publishing its annual report, it is important that they have the
ﬁnancial statements ready on time. A semi-annual audit reduces the workload of the annual audit and facil-
itates timely reporting. Managers also suggested that this would be particularly useful if the audit ﬁrm was
small and had limited resources. Third, some ﬁrms chose external auditing to complement their internal
auditing. Fourth, better performing ﬁrms that had signiﬁcant increases in revenue and proﬁts in the ﬁrst half
of the year were more likely to choose voluntary auditing to convey this information credibly to the
investment community. These interviews helped us identify determinants of voluntary audits and develop a
self-selection model to control for potential bias.
3. Theoretical development and research questions
The theoretical basis for the eﬀect of auditing on returns’ variance (or stock prices’ variance) in steady state
is obtained from the following reasoning that is formally developed in Appendix A.
1. In valuation decisions, investors aggregate accounting and non-accounting information. The relative weight
placed on each of the two information sources is proportional to its performance sensitivity and precision
(Banker and Datar, 1989).
2. Audit could decrease the bias and increase the precision of accounting information. If investors discern this
improvement in the quality, they will place higher weight on ﬁnancial statement information relative to
non-ﬁnancial information in audited ﬁrms compared to non-audited ﬁrms. This is shown in the ﬁrst part
of Appendix A.
3. Accounting information, whether it is audited or not, is common across all investors. Non-accounting
information can either be public and common across investors (such as public disclosures of new product
introductions, management changes, and strategic initiatives) or private (generated by the private insights
of the analyst or the investor). If investors increase the weight on common accounting information, it
reduces the inter-investor divergence regarding the estimated stock price for the ﬁrm. This is formally
shown in the second part of Appendix A.
4. When compared to non-audited ﬁrms, audited ﬁrms’ values are assessed more homogeneously across inves-
tors. This results in a smaller variability of stock returns and a lower trading volume for audited ﬁrms.
The above reasoning applies only in the steady state after most of the investors have fully incorporated the
earnings information in their belief revision process. However, in the short period immediately after earnings
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and Wolfson, 1981; Gillette et al., 1999; Ederington and Lee, 1996) because of the deviation between the infor-
mation in the earnings announcement and prior investor beliefs. Audited information is more likely to accen-
tuate the deviation between reported information and prior investor belief, resulting in higher transitory
variability for audited ﬁrms.
We examine the eﬀect of auditing by comparing the variability of stock returns and trading volume between
the audited and non-audited ﬁrms. Our hypotheses stated in alternate form are:
H1. Audited ﬁrms exhibit a signiﬁcantly lower variability in stock returns than non-audited ﬁrms after the
announcement of semi-annual reports.
H2. Audited ﬁrms exhibit a signiﬁcantly lower trading volume than non-audited ﬁrms after the announcement
of semi-annual reports.4. Sample, research method and results
4.1. The sample
We selected years 1997–2000 as our sample period because many observations had missing values before
1997 and quarterly ﬁnancial reporting became mandatory after 2000. Table 1 summarizes the auditing status
of listed ﬁrms during this period. Firms in China could either be restricted to domestic ownership (A shares) or
could have both domestic and foreign ownership (A and B shares). Firms cross-listed in Hong Kong also issue
H-shares to trade in Hong Kong. The motivations of ﬁrms issuing B or H-shares in seeking semi-annual vol-
untary audits are diﬀerent from those issuing only A-shares. For example, B and H-share ﬁrms could get theirTable 1
Auditing status of listed A-share ﬁrms and sample selection results.
1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
No. of listed ﬁrms 746 880 973 1080 3679
(Non-A-Share-only ﬁrms) 92 96 100 108 396
No. of A-Share ﬁrms 654 784 873 972 3283
(with missing values) 178 113 91 100 482
Firms available for sampling 476 671 782 872 2801
Audited 154 221 212 296 883
Non-audited 322 450 570 576 1918
(PT or ST)a 0 21 38 42 101
Non-audited 0 0 2 5 7
Audited 0 21 36 37 94
(Rights oﬀerings)b 83 85 99 107 374
Non-audited 51 49 51 50 201
Audited 32 36 48 57 173
Mandatory audit 32 57 84 94 267
Modiﬁed Opinion 19 40 53 30 142
Non-audited sample 271 401 517 521 1710
Voluntary audit sample 122 164 128 202 616
Total Sample 393 565 645 723 2326
a A ﬁrm is publicly labeled as a Special Treatment (ST) ﬁrm if it has reported losses for two consecutive years, or when its net asset per
share falls below par value. If an ST company continues to report losses in the third year, its label will change to Particular Treatment (PT)
and its shares will be traded only once a week, on Fridays. All ST and PT ﬁrms are required to have their semi-annual reports audited.
b Firms must have their semi-annual reports audited if they plan to issue rights in the second half of the year. Firms that issue rights in
the ﬁrst half of the year do not have to be audited.
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we limited our sample to ﬁrms that issue only A-shares. Our sample was retrieved from the A-share ﬁle of the
Taiwan Economic Journal database. Out of a total of 3679 ﬁrm-year observations that were available, we
excluded 396 non-A-share-only observations and 482 with missing values, and were left with 2801 ﬁrm-year
observations. Out of these, 883 were audited and 1918 were not. To examine the eﬀect of voluntary auditing,
we removed 101 observations of Special Treatment (ST) and Particular Treatment (PT) ﬁrms and 374 obser-
vations with rights issues during the year where semi-annual auditing is mandatory. This ﬁltering process left
us with a ﬁnal sample of 2326 ﬁrm-year observations, of which 616 observations were voluntarily audited.
4.2. Control for self-selection bias–Heckman correction
To control for self-selection, we use the Inverse Mill’s Ratio (IMR) estimated by a probit model of volun-
tary audit choice as an additional control variable when comparing the eﬀects between audited and non-
audited ﬁrms (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997; Heckman, 1976). In additional analysis, we also complement
these results using other methods. We discuss below the probit model.
Our choice of variables for the model is based both on earlier empirical tests and our interviews with man-
agers and auditors in China. While there is no published study that models voluntary audit choice, two prior
studies are helpful in identifying relevant variables. Francis et al. (1999) study examines the choice between Big
6 and non-Big 6 auditors in the US by ﬁrms to signal better ﬁnancial statement quality. Signaling by voluntary
audit choice is similar to signaling by voluntary choice of a high quality auditor and has been mentioned as
one of the factors in our interviews with managers. However, because Francis et al. (1999) is conducted in the
US, we also rely on Chen et al. (2001) who ﬁnd that earnings management incentives in China might motivate
voluntary audit decisions. In addition to these two studies, Chow (1982) and Ettredge et al. (2000) provide
additional guidance in the choice of variables. Our interviews of managers of listed ﬁrms who had the choice
to be audited and of auditors who audited some of those ﬁrms also yielded some important factors. Based on
the ﬁndings of prior studies and our interviews, we developed the following probit model to control for
self-selection:Prðzit ¼ 1Þit ¼ c0 þ c1OPCYCLEit1 þ c2CAPINT it1 þ c3Sizeit1 þ c4Leverageit1 þ c5PEit1
þ c6ROAit1 þ c7Lossit þ c8Top5it1 þ c9TACCRit1 þ c10SalesGrwthit1 þ c110Betait1
þ c12Nontradeit1 þ c13y98þ c14y99þ c15y00þ
X21
k¼1
c16kINDik þ uit ð1ÞWe give below the deﬁnitions and then discuss the rationale for selection of the variables in the above model.
Deﬁnitions:
OPCYCLE = Operating Cycle: [365 * (average inventory/cost of goods sold) + 365 * (average accounts
receivable/sales)]/30.
CAPINT = Capital Intensity: Gross PP&E/sales.
Size: natural logarithm of total assets.
Leverage: total long-term debt to total asset ratio.
PE = P/E Ratio: Stock price over EPS.
ROA = semi-annual net income over beginning total assets.
Loss: 1 for net income less than 0 and 0 otherwise.
TACCR = Total Accrual: annual total accruals.
Top5 = Top 5 Auditor: 1 if the auditor is among the top 5 in China (by market share) and 0 otherwise.
SalesGrwth = Sales growth: (sales in year t – sales in year t  1)/sales in year t – 1.
Beta: Beta estimated by the market model over the period between t = 150 to t = 30.
Nontrade: Percentage of non-tradable shares outstanding.
y98, y99 y00, indicator variables for years 1998, 1999 and 2000, respectively.
IND: Twenty-one Industry dummies based on Chinese industry classiﬁcation.
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t: interim period indicator, t  1 for beginning of the year.
The inclusion of OPCYCLE, CAPINT, Size, Leverage, PE and Loss in the model is based on Francis et al.
(1999). Firms with longer operating cycles develop accrual estimates over a longer time horizon and are there-
fore likely to have more measurement errors (see Dechow and Dichev, 2002). This resulting skepticism among
investors increases the need felt by the ﬁrm to send a positive audit signal. Accordingly, we expect ﬁrms with
longer operating cycles to opt more frequently for voluntary auditing. Firms with high capital intensity
(deﬁned as gross property, plant and equipment divided by sales) have relatively high depreciation, and their
managers can choose the depreciation method as well as estimated useful asset lives to time the recognition of
related expenses. Here again, auditing can improve the perceived reliability of reported earnings and asset
values.8 We include ﬁrm size in our model to control for ﬁrm-level diﬀerences in innate credibility and their
information environment. We expect large ﬁrms to have less need for semi-annual auditing, ceteris paribus,
since their ﬁnancial reports are more carefully scrutinized by the public than those of smaller ﬁrms. Conse-
quently, their ﬁnancial reports are generally perceived to be more reliable. As a ﬁrm’s debt level increases,
its debt holders may need to monitor its management team more closely. Therefore, ﬁrms with high leverage
ratios are more likely to employ semi-annual audits. Firms with low Price Earnings (PE) ratios are often
undervalued. Managers of these ﬁrms are more likely to resort to external auditing in their attempts to com-
municate to investors that their ﬁrms are good investment opportunities. Thus, we expect ﬁrms with lower PE
ratios to opt more frequently for interim auditing.
The selection of four other variables, namely ROA, Top5, SalesGrwth, and Loss, was based on our
interviews with partners of audit ﬁrms and managers of listed companies. ROA is the ratio of the semi-annual
period income over the previous year-end’s total assets. Some partners suggested that ﬁrms that do well in the
ﬁrst part of the year choose to be audited to signal the good news early to the market. Based on this rationale,
we expect the audited ﬁrms to have a signiﬁcantly higher ROA than non-audited ﬁrms. Large (Top5) auditors
are more independent, have high reputation and are more likely to issue modiﬁed audit opinions (DeFond
et al., 2000, 2002; Ashton and Kennedy, 2002).9 In anticipation of being held to higher standards by large
auditors, ﬁrms might be less willing to be voluntarily audited by them. Another factor is auditor workload.
Small auditors have limited resources that are stretched during annual audits and might encourage their clients
to opt for semi-annual audits to smooth out their workload. At the same time, the voluntary audit choice sig-
nal will be even more powerful and the beneﬁts might be seen to be higher if a Top5 auditor is chosen. There-
fore, we do not predict a sign on this variable but recognize that it is an important control variable. Firms with
low sales growth or losses reported in the most recent ﬁscal period are expected to be less willing to have their
semi-annual reports audited.
Further, high-risk ﬁrms (those with high accruals and high beta values) are likely to weigh the negative con-
sequences of audit more than its incremental beneﬁts; but low-risk ﬁrms are more likely to choose to be
audited. A variable that is unique to China is the percentage of outstanding non-tradable shares which proxies
for government control of the ﬁrm. Usually, managers in government-controlled ﬁrms have less need to com-
municate with investors, as these ﬁrms depend less on the market for ﬁnance and receive government protec-
tion from regulators and investors. Therefore, we expect ﬁrms with more non-tradable shares to show a lower
propensity to have their semi-annual reports audited. In our model, we employ an indicator variable for each
year and each industry to control for industry and year eﬀects.
In order to construct a parsimonious model, we exclude variables that are trivial in our sample or not
reported to be signiﬁcant in prior studies. For example, the proportion of common stock owned by oﬃcers
and directors is not included because both the mean and median values of this variable in our sample are8 As our test context is diﬀerent from that of Francis et al. (1999), who employed operating cycle and capital intensity to examine Big 6
auditors’ role in the credible reporting of accruals, we do not expect all variables adopted from their model to aﬀect the choice of semi-
annual auditing in the same way that they aﬀect the choice of Big 6 auditors.
9 Identifying a group of large auditors as high quality in China may be arbitrary. Therefore, we also used other classiﬁcation schemes
such as Top 10 (DeFond et al., 2000) instead of Top 5 and did not ﬁnd qualitatively diﬀerent empirical results.
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total accruals in our model. The number of business segments is not relevant for most ﬁrms.
We report the probit model results in Table 2. The results are generally consistent with our expectations.
They show that the decision for semi-annual auditing is negatively associated with PE ratio, loss reported in
the previous year, large auditor (Top5), risk (Beta) and percentage of non-tradable shares outstanding.
Leverage, proﬁtability (ROA) and sales growth are positively associated with the choice for semi-annual
auditing. Firm size has a negative coeﬃcient but is not statistically signiﬁcant, and the likelihood ratio is very
signiﬁcant, which indicates that the probit model eﬀectively diﬀerentiates between audited and non-audited
observations.
The Heckman (1976) correction for self-selection bias is an appropriate method to use in this particular
context for the following reasons. The method is robust in cases where the two sets of variables overlap
(one used for the probit model and the other to determine the eﬀect of audit on information divergence).
Johnston and DiNardo (1997) argue that this correction is less sensitive to normality assumptions when these
two sets of variables diﬀer. In this study, the variables that aﬀect the outcome include the variability of the
returns prior to the announcement and other variables that diﬀer from variables used in the probit model. This
makes the IMR method less sensitive to normality assumptions. Second, in most situations, it is diﬃcult to
ﬁnd variables that aﬀect probability but do not factor in the equation that tests the diﬀerences (Johnston
and DiNardo, 1997). In our study, we use a number of variables that aﬀect stock market variability and trad-
ing volume but they do not necessarily predict the choice of voluntary auditing. For example, random arrival
of value relevant information may aﬀect both return variability and trading volume. However, it is not
expected to aﬀect the choice for semi-annual audit. We include the absolute value of cumulative abnormal
returns during the announcement period to control for this factor in the model for testing the eﬀect of
auditing, but not in the probit model.10
4.3. Eﬀect of auditing on stock-return variability and trading volume
4.3.1. Auditing and stock-return variability
The following model is employed to compare the standard deviations of the risk-adjusted abnormal daily
returns between audited and non-audited sub-samples following the announcement of interim ﬁnancial reports:10 La
interpr
11 We
report.
all thevpost ¼ a0 þ a1Audit þ a2vpre þ a3Sizeþ a4vannual þ a5IMRþ a6ABS CARþ a7y98þ a8y99þ b900þ e ð2Þ
where vpost is the standard deviation of ﬁrm’s risk-adjusted abnormal daily returns after semi-annual audit,
Audit = 1 if audited and 0 if not audited, vpre is the standard deviation of ﬁrm’s risk-adjusted abnormal daily
returns before semi-annual audit, vannual is the standard deviation of ﬁrm’s returns after announcement of
annual earnings made prior to each semi-annual audit, Size is the natural logarithm of equity’s beginning
market value, IMR is the Inverse Mills Ratio from the probit model, ABS_CAR is the absolute value of
risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns over the post-announcement period and y98, y99, y00 are indicator
variables for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000, respectively.
Post-announcement return variability is measured by the standard deviation of risk-adjusted11 daily abnor-
mal returns over three diﬀerent event windows after the semi-annual earnings announcement date (+1 to +7,
+1 to +15 and +1 to +30). Likewise, pre-announcement return variability is measured by the standard devi-
ation of risk-adjusted abnormal returns over three diﬀerent time windows before the semi-annual earnings
announcement dates (7 to 1, 15 to 1 and 1 to 30). The announcement date is excluded from both
pre- and post-announcement periods. This model is estimated separately over each of the three event windows.
A signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient on the indicator variable, Audit, would indicate that audited semi-annual
ﬁnancial statements are associated with less return variability than non-audited ﬁrms.rcker and Rusticus (2005) show limitations of using instrumental variables in accounting research. As an exercise of caution in
eting our results, extensive robustness checks are performed and discussed in a subsequent section.
estimate the alpha and beta of each ﬁrm year over the period between 150 and 30 days before the announcement of its semi-annual
In order to address concerns about the reasonableness of the market model in China and other emerging markets, we have repeated
tests with market-adjusted return data and found qualitatively similar results.
Table 2
Control for self selection – probit regression results.
Prðzit ¼ 1Þit ¼ c0 þ c1OPCYCLEit1 þ c2CAPINT it1 þ c3Sizeit1 þ c4Leverageit1
þ c5PEit1 þ c6ROAit1 þ c7Lossit þ c8Top5it1 þ c9TACCRit1
þ c10SalesGrwthit1 þ c110Betait1 þ c12Nontradeit1 þ c13y98
þ c14y99þ c15y00þ
X21
k¼1
c16kINDik þ uit
Estimate Wald chi-square
Intercept 1.265 3.202*
OPCYCLE 0.001 0.059
CAPINT 0.180 4.418**
Size 0.069 1.304
Leverage 1.203 9.445***
PE 0.325 14.561***
ROA 13.645 47.137***
Loss 1.867 19.572***
Top5 0.718 4.234**
TACCR 0.007 0.001
SalesGrwth 0.201 5.493**
Beta 0.919 25.540***
Nontrade 1.880 22.901***
y98 0.203 1.712
y99 0.740 21.210***
y00 0.238 2.351
(21 Industry indicator variables not tabulated)
Likelihood ratio test: 1186
Pseudo R-square 0.186
N = 1710 for non-audited and 616 for audited group
Dependent variable is an audit choice indicator: 1 for audited interim ﬁnancial statements
and 0 otherwise. All independent variables are measured at the beginning of the year
except ROA which is semi-annual net income over total assets at the last year end.
OPCYCLE: 365 * (average inventory/cost of goods sold) + 365 * (average accounts
receivable/sales)/30; CPINT: Gross PP&E/sales; Size: Natural logarithm of total assets;
Leverage: Total debt to total asset ratio; PE: Stock price over EPS; Loss: 1 for net income
less than 0 and 0 otherwise; TACCR: Annual total accruals; Top5: 1 if the auditor is
among the top 5 in China and 0 otherwise; SalesGrwth: (sales in year t – sales in year
t  1)/sales in year t  1; Beta: Beta estimated by the Market Model; Nontrade: Per-
centage of non-tradable shares outstanding; y98, y99, y00: Indicator variables for years
1998, 1999 and 2000, respectively.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%, two-tailed.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%, two-tailed.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%, two-tailed.
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resemble diversiﬁed portfolios and consequently have lower return variability. The pre-announcement stan-
dard deviation of returns (respectively over the three event windows) is a control for other ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors
that aﬀect the variability of returns. It also captures the level of pre-announcement information divergence
among investors as Atiase and Bamber (1994) ﬁnd it to be positively related with trading volume reaction
to announcements of accounting information. Additionally, Atiase and Bamber (1994) also ﬁnd that trading
volume reaction is positively associated with the absolute value of cumulative abnormal returns during the
announcement period. Therefore, ABS_CAR is included to control for this eﬀect. As a further control for
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors, we include the post-annual-announcement return variability of the previous year when
all ﬁnancial reports are audited. This control variable is necessary because of the possibility that the trading
behavior of investors could be diﬀerent between the audited and non-audited groups in our sample irrespective
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self-selection bias by including the IMR from the probit model as an additional control variable.4.3.2. Auditing and trading volume
We employ the following model to examine the eﬀects of auditing on average daily trading volume in the
three windows deﬁned earlier:TV post ¼ b0 þ b1Audit þ b2TV pre þ b3Sizeþ b4TV annual þ b5IMRþ b6MTV þ b7ABS CARþ b8y98
þ b9y99þ b10y00þ e ð3Þwhere TVpost is the average daily trading volume after semi-annual announcements, Audit = 1 if audited and 0
if not audited, TVpre is the average daily trading volume before semi-annual announcements, Size is the
natural logarithm of equity’s beginning market value, TVannual is the average daily trading volume after annual
announcements, IMR is the Inverse Mills Ratio from the probit model, MTV is the average daily market
trading volume, ABS_CAR is the absolute value of risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns over the
post-announcement period and y98, y99, y00 are indicator variables for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000,
respectively.
We measure trading volume as the average daily percentage of outstanding shares traded for a given ﬁrm.
The market-wide trading volume is the average daily total number of all trades divided by the total number of
all outstanding shares for the stock exchange.
We control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects by including the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at
t = 30, the pre-announcement trading volume and the post-annual announcement trading volume in the
regression. We use market-wide average daily trading volume to control for the market-wide trading intensity
eﬀect on the trading volume of the ﬁrm. We employ TVpre and ABS_CAR to control for the eﬀect of the posi-
tive association between these two variables and the trading volume reaction to disclosure of accounting infor-
mation as reported in Atiase and Bamber (1994). Finally, we use year indicator variables, and include the IMR
to control for ﬁxed eﬀects and self-selection bias, respectively.4.4. Univariate analysis
Panel A of Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables, vpre, vpost, vannual (standard deviations
of ﬁrm returns before and after semi-annual earnings announcements, and after the previous annual
announcements, respectively) and market size. The variability after the announcement of semi-annual reports
(vpost) is signiﬁcantly (p < 0.01) lower for the audited group than for the non-audited group in all the three
event windows.
The magnitude of the diﬀerence in the variability after announcements is about 10% in each of the three
windows. The pre-announcement period return variability (vpre) is also higher for the non-audited group in
the 15 and 30-day event windows, but not in the 7-day window. The change in return variability (vpost  vpre)
is positive only in the 7-day event window for the non-audited group. Its negative value in all other cells indi-
cates a general decrease in the variability of stock returns for both audited and non-audited groups after the
announcement of interim reports. Moreover, the decrease in the variability is signiﬁcantly larger for the
audited group in all event windows. Though these results are consistent with our expectations, we do not
attempt to draw conclusions based on the univariate results without controlling for other factors that may
aﬀect the diﬀerence between the audited and non-audited groups. The absolute value of cumulative abnormal
returns is signiﬁcantly smaller at conventional levels for the audited group only in the 7-day and 15-day event
windows, which indicates that the eﬀect of auditing on the abnormal returns does not persist into the future.
Audited observations are larger in terms of market capitalization. The IMR, by construction, is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent between audited and non-audited observations. Noting that all ﬁrms need to be audited annually, a
comparison of vannual between audited and non-audited ﬁrms fails to show signiﬁcant diﬀerences in any of the
three event windows. This corroborates the interpretation that the diﬀerences after semi-annual audits are not
driven by systematic diﬀerences between audited and non-audited ﬁrms, because when annual ﬁnancial reports
Table 3
Descriptive statistics and univariate comparisons of stock-return variability and trading volume between audited and non-audited ﬁrms.
Variable Days Non-audited Audited T z
Mean Std Median Mean Std Median
Panel A: Variability model variables
Stock return variability
Vpost 7 2.115 0.930 1.931 1.899 0.864 1.713 5.22
*** 5.12***
Vpre 7 2.055 0.950 1.856 2.055 0.904 1.819 0.01 0.48
Vpost  Vpre 7 0.060 1.152 0.073 0.156 1.118 0.145 4.08*** 4.924***
Vannual 7 2.345 1.139 2.077 2.301 1.115 2.050 0.82 0.64
ABS_CAR 7 4.649 3.995 3.546 4.348 3.750 3.547 1.68* 1.21
Vpost 15 2.046 0.728 1.933 1.829 0.654 1.691 6.84
*** 6.47***
Vpre 15 2.136 0.790 1.990 2.077 0.745 1.961 1.66
* 1.22
Vpost  Vpre 15 0.090 0.885 0.08/2 0.247 0.838 0.260 3.95*** 3.95***
Vannual 15 2.349 0.968 2.163 2.314 0.934 2.151 0.79 0.49
ABS_CAR 15 6.739 5.646 5.272 6.286 5.310 5.039 1.78* 1.27
Vpost 30 1.942 0.602 1.885 1.783 0.514 1.703 6.27
*** 5.52***
Vpre 30 2.251 0.703 2.161 2.170 0.686 2.053 2.47
** 2.59***
Vpost  Vpre 30 0.309 0.775 0.289 0.387 0.727 0.328 2.26* 2.00*
Vannual 30 2.413 0.794 2.334 2.362 0.782 2.231 1.40 1.36
ABS_CAR 30 9.780 8.283 7.523 9.317 8.005 7.355 1.22 1.21
Size 30 7.733 0.747 7.696 7.873 0.755 7.876 3.96*** 4.19***
IMR 30 0.427 0.218 0.419 1.051 0.275 1.025 120.63*** 36.85***
Panel B: Trading volume model variables
Trading Volume
TVpost 7 2.038 1.516 1.674 1.580 1.247 1.281 6.97
*** 6.13***
TVpre 7 1.685 1.254 1.446 1.501 1.106 1.233 3.02
*** 2.82***
TVpost  TVPre 7 0.352 1.588 0.154 0.079 1.254 0.044 4.31*** 3.88***
TVannual 7 3.024 2.050 2.772 3.167 2.163 2.817 1.09 1.10
MTV 7 1.584 1.704 0.424 1.590 1.723 0.448 0.30 0.46
TVpost 15 1.931 1.481 1.411 1.467 1.179 1.029 8.63
*** 7.11***
TVpre 15 1.738 1.426 1.309 1.526 1.184 1.187 3.69
*** 4.06***
TVpost  TVPre 15 0.193 1.381 0.112 0.592 1.149 0.010 4.41*** 4.01***
TVannual 15 2.819 2.052 2.349 2.941 2.094 2.371 1.09 1.26
MTV 15 1.545 1.587 0.349 1.568 1.665 0.371 1.34 1.39*
TVpost 30 1.729 1.153 1.424 1.305 0.810 1.104 9.85
*** 8.11***
TVpre 30 1.948 1.321 1.616 1.721 1.298 1.353 3.71
*** 4.43***
TVpost  TVPre 30 0.220 1.410 0.097 0.416 1.203 0.242 3.30*** 3.83***
TVannual 30 2.703 1.856 2.259 2.693 1.836 2.188 0.12 0.19
MTV 30 1.409 0.256 1.358 1.423 0.270 1.409 1.07 0.76
Size 30 7.744 0.752 7.707 7.877 0.759 7.891 3.74*** 3.955***
IMR 30 0.427 0.219 0.419 1.050 0.273 1.021 120.70*** 36.82***
Vpost: Standard deviation of risk-adjusted abnormal returns after semi-annual announcements (0 < t < 8, 0 < t < 16 and 0 < t < 31 for 7-
day, 15-day and 30-day event windows, respectively); Vpre: Standard deviation of risk-adjusted abnormal returns before semi-annual
announcements (8 < t < 0, 16 < t < 0 and 31 < t < 0 for 7-day, 15-day and 30-day event windows, respectively); Vannual: Standard
deviation of risk-adjusted abnormal returns after annual announcements (0 < t < 8, 0 < t < 16 and 0 < t < 31 for 7-day, 15-day and 30-day
event windows, respectively); ABS_CAR: absolute value of risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns over the post-announcement
period; Size: Natural logarithm of beginning market value of equity; TVpost: Average daily trading volume after semi-annual
announcements (0 < t < 8, 0 < t < 16 and 0 < t < 31 for 7-day, 15-day and 30-day event windows, respectively); TVpre: Average daily
trading volume before semi-annual announcements (8 < t < 0, 16 < t < 0 and 31 < t < 0 for 7-day, 15-day and 30-day event windows,
respectively); TVannual: Average daily trading volume after annual announcements (0 < t < 8, 0 < t < 16 and 0 < t < 31 for 7-day, 15-day
and 30-day event windows, respectively); MTV: Market-wide average trading volume after semi-annual announcements (0 < t < 8,
0 < t < 16 and 0 < t < 31 for 7-day, 15-day and 30-day event windows, respectively); IMR: Inverse Mills ratio as estimated by Model (1);
N = 1710 (1706) for non-audited group and 616 (615) for audited group in Panel A (B).
* Signiﬁcant at 10%, two-tailed.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%, two-tailed.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1% two-tailed.
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any of the post-announcement periods (+1 to +7, +1 to +15, +1 to +30).
Comparison of trading volume in Panel B of Table 3 shows that the average daily post-announcement trad-
ing volume for the audited group is signiﬁcantly smaller than that of the non-audited group in all the three
event windows. The magnitude of the diﬀerence varies from 22% to 24%, which is economically material.
The decrease in average trading volume over the pre- and post-announcement periods is signiﬁcantly larger
for the audited group than for the non-audited groups in all three event windows. Speciﬁcally, between 7
and +7 days relative to the announcement of semi-annual reports, the average trading volume increases
slightly for both audited (from 1.501 to 1.580) and non-audited groups (from 1.685 to 2.038), but the change
is much smaller for the audited (0.079) than for the non-audited group (0.647). In the 15 to +15 window, the
average trading volume of the audited group drops from 1.526 to 1.467 (3.8%), but it increases for the non-
audited group from 1.738 to 1.931 (11.1%). In the 30 to +30 period, the average trading volume for the
audited group drops from 1.721 to 1.305 (24.2%), overshadowing that of the non-audited group, which is only
11.2% from 1.948 to 1.729. A comparison of TVRannual between audited and non-audited groups does not
exhibit signiﬁcant or consistent diﬀerences across the three windows. This result further augments the inter-
pretation that the diﬀerence in trading volume after semi-annual audits is not driven by systematic diﬀerences
between audited and non-audited ﬁrms.
We also plot the three-day mean and median values of variability of returns and trading volume over the
period between 30 and +30 in Figs. 1–4. Consistent with our expectations, there is a marked increase in both
measures of inter-investor information divergence immediately following the announcement of semi-annual
reports (0 to +2), but a sustained decrease thereafter. The decreases in the return variability and trading
volume are consistently greater in the audited group than in the non-audited group.
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increases in variability and volume reported in the literature, (ii) a steady state decrease in inter-investor belief
divergence for all ﬁrms and (iii) a relatively higher decrease in divergence for the audited ﬁrms.4.5. Multivariate analysis
Table 4 summarizes regression results comparing return variability and trading volume between the audited
and the non-audited groups. Panel A of Table 4 shows the return variability results of Model 2; and panel B of
Table 4 shows the trading volume results of Model 3. Audit coeﬃcients in both models are signiﬁcantly
(p < 0.01) negative across three diﬀerent window lengths, which indicates that audited ﬁnancial statements
are associated with smaller standard deviations of stock returns and lower average daily trading volume. Com-
pared to the mean value of the standard deviation of returns in non-audited ﬁrms, the coeﬃcients of Audit
suggest a reduction of 31% in the 7-day window, 35% in the 15-day window and 30% in the 30-day window.
Similarly, the turnover reductions are 87%, 94% and 93.7% respectively in the 7, 15 and 30-day windows.12
These reductions are both statistically signiﬁcant and economically material.
The adjusted R2 of the variability model increases for longer event windows, mainly because of increased
association between post- and pre-announcement standard deviations. The IMR coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant in
all cases. Consistent with our expectations, the post-announcement return variability and trading volume are12 These computations are performed as follows. Consider the standard deviation of returns, Vpost for non-audited ﬁrms in the 7-day
window in Table 3 = 2.115. The coeﬃcient of Audit in Table 4 for the 7-day window is .654. The reduction is computed as .654/
2.115 = 31%.
Table 4
Multivariate analysis of the eﬀect of audit on stock-return variability and trading volume.
Event window 7 Days (0 < t < 8) 15 Days (0 < t < 16) 30 Days (0 < t < 31)
Panel A: Return variability model (Vpost)
Intercept 3.145 (16.14)*** 2.599 (16.26)*** 2.335 (18.00)***
Audit 0.654 (5.48)*** 0.715 (7.73)*** 0.587 (7.80)***
Vpre 0.136 (6.79)
*** 0.213 (11.66)*** 0.243 (14.18)***
Size 0.190 (7.86)*** 0.150 (7.94)*** 0.149 (9.68)***
Vannual 0.030 (1.99)
** 0.045 (3.05)*** 0.059 (4.02)***
IMR 0.323 (4.36)*** 0.363 (6.36)*** 0.308 (6.58)***
ABS_CAR 0.082 (16.97)*** 0.042 (16.63)*** 0.020 (14.26)***
Y98 0.087 (1.54) 0.021 (0.50) 0.227 (6.84)***
Y99 0.224 (3.88)*** 0.184 (4.02)*** 0.185 (4.98)***
Y00 0.228 (4.20)*** 0.108 (2.50)** 0.033 (0.94)
Adjusted R2 0.248 0.296 0.329
n = 1710 (616) for non-audited (audited) group
Panel B: Trading volume model (TVpost)
Intercept 0.605 (1.50) 2.129 (5.26)*** 2.433 (8.25)***
Audit 1.766 (9.34)*** 1.814 (11.11)*** 1.621 (11.57)***
TVpre 0.466 (17.33)
*** 0.423 (17.09)*** 0.268 (13.81)***
Size 0.174 (4.68)*** 0.251 (7.53)*** 0.299 (10.42)***
TVannual 0.020 (1.83)
* 0.026 (2.04)** 0.080 (5.56)***
IMR 0.985 (8.28)*** 0.995 (9.63)*** 0.869 (9.84)***
MTV 0.940 (7.44)*** 0.511 (3.15)*** 0.467 (4.13)***
ABS_CAR 0.144 (15.52)*** 0.072 (14.41)*** 0.033 (11.97)***
Y98 0.397 (2.79)*** 0.167 (1.11) 0.522 (6.73)***
Y99 0.208 (1.74)* 0.059 (0.48) 0.055 (0.63)
Y00 0.095 (1.03) 0.209 (2.51)** 0.392 (5.81)***
Adjusted R2 0.455 0.421 0.373
n = 1706 (615) for non-audited (audited) group
White-covariance-consistent t is reported in parentheses next to the estimated coeﬃcient. Dependent variable in Panel A is Vpost: Standard
deviation of risk-adjusted abnormal returns after semi-annual announcements; Vpre: Standard deviation of risk-adjusted abnormal returns
before semi-annual announcements; Vannual: Standard deviation of risk-adjusted abnormal returns after annual announcements; Size:
Natural logarithm of beginning market value of equity; IMR: Inverse Mills ratio; ABS_CAR: absolute value of risk-adjusted cumulative
abnormal returns over the post-announcement period. Dependent variable in Panel B is TVpost: Average daily trading volume after semi-
annual announcements; TVpre: Average daily trading volume before semi-annual announcements; TVannual: Average daily trading volume
after annual announcements; MTV: Market-wide average daily trading volume after semi-annual announcements.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%, two-tailed.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%, two-tailed.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%, two-tailed.
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ity and trading volume, respectively. Size has a negative association with return variability and trading volume
in all three event windows. Consistent with results reported by Atiase and Bamber (1994), the estimated
coeﬃcients of our measures of pre-announcement level of belief divergence (vpre, TVpre) and ABS_CAR are
signiﬁcantly (p < 0.01) positive. Results in both Panel A (variability) and Panel B (trading volume) are con-
sistent with our prior expectations; they suggest greater information convergence in the audited group than
in the non-audited group after controlling for self-selection (IMR), general information environment (Size),
other inherent diﬀerences in the variability (vpre, vannual, TVpre,MTV), and year-speciﬁc eﬀects (year dummies).4.6. Alternative control for self-selection: two-stage regression
We employ a two-stage regression analysis through estimation of a simultaneous system of equations in
which the post-announcement return variability (or trading volume) is determined simultaneously with the
choice of semi-annual audit. We then use all the control variables that we have identiﬁed in Models 1–3 to
solve the model. Since one of the endogenous variables (Audit) is dichotomous and the other (Vpost) is contin-
uous, we adapt the program suggested by Keshk (2003), which is speciﬁcally designed to solve this type of
Table 5
Alternative control for self-selection bias: two-stage regression.
Event window 7 Days (0 < t < 8) 15 Days (0 < t < 16) 30 Days (0 < t < 31)
Panel A: Return variability model (Vpost)
Intercept 2.915 (13.98)*** 2.370 (13.67)*** 2.129 (14.74)***
Audit 0.769 (5.88)*** 0.854 (8.03)*** 0.728 (8.33)***
Vpre 0.146 (7.54)
*** 0.217 (11.3)*** 0.252 (13.26)***
Size 0.156 (5.77)*** 0.113 (5.17)*** 0.115 (6.38)***
Vannual 0.025 (1.58) 0.038 (2.45)
** 0.049 (3.14)***
ABS_CAR 0.082 (18.31)*** 0.042 (16.5)*** 0.019 (13.57)***
Y98 0.092 (1.63) 0.015 (0.33) 0.218 (5.76)***
Y99 0.259 (4.23)*** 0.224 (4.46)*** 0.231 (5.53)***
Y00 0.254 (4.26)*** 0.137 (2.83)*** 0.002 (0.05)
Adjusted R2 0.229 0.249 0.269
n = 1710 (616) for non-audited (audited) group
Panel B: Trading volume model (TVpost)
Intercept 0.073 (0.16) 1.426 (2.89)*** 1.853 (5.02)***
Audit 2.039 (9.14)*** 2.059 (10.12)*** 1.858 (10.50)***
TVpre 0.462 (20.85)
*** 0.416 (18.45)*** 0.266 (13.02)***
Size 0.090 (1.94)* 0.164 (3.91)*** 0.228 (6.31)***
TVannual 0.030 (2.31)
** 0.037 (2.63)*** 0.081 (5.41)***
MTV 0.972 (7.00)*** 0.539 (2.87)*** 0.531 (3.78)***
ABS_CAR 0.143 (19.67)*** 0.072 (15.34)*** 0.033 (11.95)***
Y98 0.438 (2.68)*** 0.196 (1.15) 0.529 (5.66)***
Y99 0.190 (1.45) 0.070 (0.52) 0.016 (0.16)
Y00 0.047 (0.45) 0.166 (1.77)* 0.334 (4.07)***
Adjusted R2 0.365 0.313 0.264
n = 1706 (615) for non-audited (audited) group
Dependent variable in Panel A is Vpost: Standard deviation of risk-adjusted abnormal returns after semi-annual announcements; Vpre:
Standard deviation of risk-adjusted abnormal returns before semi-annual announcements; Vannual: Standard deviation of risk-adjusted
abnormal returns after annual announcements; Size: Natural logarithm of beginning market value of equity; ABS_CAR: absolute value of
risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal return over the post-announcement period. Dependent variable in Panel B is TVpost: Average daily
trading volume after semi-annual announcements; TVpre: Average daily trading volume before semi-annual announcements; TVannual:
Average daily trading volume after annual announcements; MTV: Market-wide average daily trading volume after semi-annual
announcements.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%, two-tailed.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%, two-tailed.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%, two-tailed.
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simultaneity, we continue to ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative associations between the audit variable and return var-
iability (or trading volume) in all three windows.4.7. The change model
To check the sensitivity of our results against alternative model speciﬁcations, we test the following change
model:Change¼ k0þk1Sizeþk2Auditþk4Changeannualþk5IMRþk6ABS CARþk7y98þk8y99þk900þ e ð4Þ
where Change is vpost  vpre for the return variability test and TVpost  TVpre for the trading volume test. Sim-
ilarly, Changeannual is the change in return variability (or trading volume) over the annual report announcement
period in the prior year. The results are reported in Table 6. The estimated coeﬃcient of the audit variable is
signiﬁcantly negative across all three windows for both variability and trading volume models. In addition, we
tested a size-deﬂated variability model by dividing both the left-hand side variable (Vpre) and the right-hand
side variable (Vpost) by Size and kept all other control variables unchanged. After running this model in all
three event windows, we found that the results were not qualitatively diﬀerent from that reported in Panel A
Table 6
Analysis of the eﬀect of audit on the change between post- and pre-announcement stock-return variability and trading volume.
Event window 7 Days 15 Days 30 Days
Panel A: Return variability model (Vpost  Vpre)
Intercept 0.719 (2.79)*** 0.327 (1.66)* 0.233 (1.44)
Audit 0.394 (2.42)** 0.450 (3.54)*** 0.410 (3.99)***
Size 0.120 (3.55)*** 0.079 (3.09)*** 0.082 (3.88)***
Ch_Vannual 0.016 (0.84) 0.017 (0.93) 0.047 (2.71)***
IMR 0.131 (1.28) 0.192 (2.43)** 0.190 (2.94)***
ABS_CAR 0.059 (8.41)*** 0.032 (8.84)*** 0.013 (6.54)***
Y98 0.084 (1.02) 0.239 (3.97)*** 0.477 (10.53)***
Y99 0.109 (1.34) 0.214 (3.45)*** 0.461 (9.51)***
Y00 0.203 (2.60)*** 0.219 (3.64)*** 0.255 (5.33)***
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.093 0.244
n = 1710 (616) for non-audited (audited) group
Panel B: Trading Volume Model (TVpost – TVpre)
Intercept 2.082 (5.08)*** 0.432 (0.96) 0.202 (0.56)
Audit 0.818 (4.33)*** 0.756 (4.24)*** 0.644 (3.56)***
Size 0.077 (2.03)** 0.048 (1.33) 0.043 (1.24)
Ch_TVannual 0.005 (0.45) 0.007 (0.52) 0.002 (0.16)
IMR 0.448 (3.70)*** 0.409 (3.61)*** 0.322 (2.77)***
Ch_MKT 0.929 (6.42)
*** 0.095 (0.48) 0.294 (1.95)*
ABS_CAR 0.190 (18.40)*** 0.119 (20.11)*** 0.068 (19.21)***
Y98 0.575 (3.76)*** 0.099 (0.58) 0.479 (5.33)***
Y99 0.150 (1.27) 0.692 (5.53)*** 1.161 (12.36)***
Y00 0.258 (2.93)*** 0.123 (1.61) 0.065 (0.89)
Adjusted R2 0.294 0.302 0.343
n = 1706 (615) for non-audited (audited) group
White-covariance-consistent t is reported in parentheses next to the estimated coeﬃcient. Dependent variable in Panel A is Vpost  Vpre as
deﬁned in Table 4 over semi-annual announcement period; Audit: 1 for audited observations and 0 otherwise; Ch_Vannual: Vpost  Vpre over
the annual ﬁnancial statement announcement period; Size: Natural logarithm of beginning market value of equity; IMR: Inverse Mills
Ratio; ABS_CAR: absolute value of risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal return over the post-announcement period. Dependent variable in
Panel B is TVpost  TVpre over semi-annual announcement period; Ch_TVannual: TVpost - TVpre over annual announcement period;
Ch_MKT: Market-wide average daily trading volume after semi-annual announcements minus market-wide average daily trading volume
before the announcements.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%, two-tailed.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%, two-tailed.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%, two-tailed.
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qualitatively diﬀerent from that reported in Panel B of Table 4. Therefore, we conclude there is no evidence that
our main results were driven by size.
4.8. Robustness checks13
4.8.1. Eﬀect of auditing on frequency of modiﬁed audit opinions
Financial statements that are more reliable should be associated with a lower frequency of modiﬁed audit
opinions (MAOs) ceteris paribus. We adopt the logistic regression model constructed by Chen et al. (2001) to
test whether ﬁrms with audited semi-annual reports are less likely to receive MAOs at the year end as com-
pared to those whose semi-annual reports are not audited. This model controls for the client’s ﬁrm size,
accounting performance (ROA), debt level, systematic risk (Beta) and other factors that aﬀect the likelihood
of receiving MAOs in China. The results show that the audited group has a signiﬁcantly (p < 0.01) lower
frequency of receiving MAOs than the non-audited group. This evidence is consistent with the notion that
auditing improves the reliability of ﬁnancial statements and thereby decreases the likelihood of MAOs.13 In the interest of space, empirical results reported in this section are not tabulated. However, they are available from authors upon
request.
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We compared a sample of 435 observations whose interim reports are audited in the current year with 377
observations whose interim reports were audited previously but not in the current year by estimating Model
(2) and ﬁnd that the Audit variable is signiﬁcantly negative in all three event windows. This indicates that ﬁrms
whose interim reports are audited in the current year show a lower return variability than ﬁrms who chose
auditing of interim reports in the past but have since discontinued it. This ﬁnding is consistent with the
argument that the reduced variability in returns arises from auditing of interim statements that year rather
than ﬁrm characteristics or the auditing of the interim statements in previous years.
4.8.3. Analysis of ﬁrst-time semi-annual audits
In this test, we focused on observations without repeated semi-annual audits to test whether our results
were driven by repeatedly audited observations. The results remained qualitatively unchanged after we
excluded repeatedly audited observations from our sample.
4.8.4. Eﬀect of auditing when alternative empirical proxies are used
We performed additional tests to examine the robustness of the results when alternative empirical proxies
are employed by repeating all regression analyses reported in Table 4. In the variability model, we replaced
risk-adjusted returns with market-index-adjusted returns to calculate the standard deviation. In the trading
volume model, we replaced average trading volume with total trading volume over the event window. Results
were not qualitatively diﬀerent. Furthermore, in addition to return variability and trading volume, we used the
average diﬀerence between the daily high and low prices of the stock (the bid-ask spread information is not
available to us) as a rough proxy for information asymmetry and found a signiﬁcantly larger reduction in this
variable for the audit group than for the non-audited group in all three event windows.
4.8.5. Examination of stock-return variability and volume using a matched sample
We also perform matched sample tests to check the robustness of our results as inherent ﬁrm-speciﬁc dif-
ferences between audited and non-audited ﬁrms may aﬀect both pre and post-announcement trading behavior.
Audited observations are matched with non-audited ones by year on the following ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables indi-
vidually: SIZE, beta, Vpre and TVpre. This approach is essentially similar to including these ﬁrm characteristics
as control variables in the model. However, matched samples are more homogeneous and the subsequent com-
parison of the eﬀect of auditing is conducted between two groups of observations with similar size, systematic
risk or pre-announcement belief divergence level, respectively. The results are not qualitatively diﬀerent from
those reported in Table 4.
4.8.6. Extended time period analysis
We explore the persistent length of time in the diﬀerence between audited and non-audited groups. We ﬁnd
no substantial diﬀerences between the standard deviations of audited and non-audited observations before
30 and after +30. Even though some minor diﬀerences continue for up to 180 days after the release of
semi-annual ﬁnancial statements, the system seems to typically reset itself after 30 days, with the inﬂow of
more information.
4.8.7. Analysis after removing the period of variability and volume increase
As discussed earlier, the pattern of variability and volume changes shows an increase in the variability of
stock returns14 and volume of trading for two days following the announcement. We repeated our analysis
removing the [2,+2] time period from the sample periods but this did not change our results.14 The absence of a well-developed options market in China precludes us from measuring implied variability based on option prices.
Further, since variances calculated over a short window of two days may not be very reliable, we subtracted the variance calculated over
the truncated post-announcement windows from that over the full post-announcement windows and compared the diﬀerences between
these variance with the variances in the corresponding pre-announcement windows and found them to be positive for both audited and
non-audited ﬁrms (showing an increase in variance over a two-day post-announcement period).
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Using a sample of Chinese ﬁrms, we provide evidence that auditing decreases information divergence across
investors measured by reduced stock return variability and trading volume. We ﬁnd that the reduction in stock
return variability and trading volume are both statistically signiﬁcant and economically material. Results are
robust after controlling for self-selection bias and several other factors. Our ﬁndings are consistent with the
argument that investors place more weight on audited ﬁnancial statements than on non-audited ones in
pricing stocks.
Our results show that auditing has the beneﬁcial eﬀect of decreasing inter-investor divergence even in an
emerging economy such as China. Our ﬁndings are consistent with the argument that the beneﬁts of auditing
in improving the conﬁdence of ordinary investors who rely on public information do not require a highly
developed market and legal infrastructure. From a policy perspective, emerging economies are justiﬁed in
investing in auditing infrastructure and seeking to improve ﬁnancial reporting quality to stimulate investments
without necessarily waiting for the full development of legal and market infrastructures. China has justiﬁably
taken steps to increase investor conﬁdence by changes in regulations that create a disciplined and regulated
audit market (China Securities Regulation Commission, 2000). The actions taken by Chinese regulators
include: revocation of audit licenses for those involved in fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting; closure of auditing
ﬁrms that provide misleading audit reports; implementation of new audit standards modeled after interna-
tional practices; and eﬀecting more stringent disclosure requirements on ﬁrms receiving modiﬁed audit
opinions.15
Although this study is based on the Chinese context, we believe that investors in China are motivated by
similar economic incentives as in other parts of the world and to that extent the ﬁndings can be generalized to
other emerging economies. However, institutional diﬀerences between countries should be considered when
generalizing our results.Acknowledgments
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In this appendix, we present a formal development of our reasoning. We show that when auditing reduces
the bias and/or improves the precision of accounting information, there is less variability in stock returns and
less trading volume in audited ﬁrms as compared to non-audited ﬁrms.
Step 1: Auditing increases the weight placed by investors on accounting information relative to non-accounting
information in valuing stocks.
In this step, we consider only one investor and one stock. Ohlson (1995) and Easton (1999), posit a valu-
ation model that combines accounting and non-accounting information. We write the market price of the
stock as P, a linear combination of an accounting-based value as z, and a non-accounting based value as u:15 Fo
of majP ¼ a1zþ a2u ðA1ÞIn Eq. (A1) the time t is suppressed. Under the Clean surplus model in Ohlson (1995), zt = [yt  d(R  1)
yt1] + dxt, where the subscript t represents a particular period, y is the book value, x is the earnings, R is the
risk-free return and d is a scalar. In a more general case, we can think of z as the valuation that results from allr example, since 1998, the names of ﬁrms that receive disclaimers and adverse opinions are required to be exposed on the front page
or securities newspapers once every two weeks.
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periods. On the other hand, u represents the valuation that results from all non-accounting information avail-
able in the market during the relevant period.
For any particular individual investor, however, the valuation of the stock depends on how he or she aggre-
gates the two sources of information. In particular, all non-accounting information is not available to all
investors. Non-accounting information includes private information that is distributed among investors. Some
investors receive more information than others.16Given these diﬀerences, the stock valuation by investor i can
be written as follows:16 Th
O’Har
17 It
Altern
18 Ev
diﬀere
to cap
19 We
assum
non-ac
20 We
21 Th
and la
are ‘a’
22 On
functioV i ¼ c1zR þ c2ui ðA2Þ
In Eq. (A2), zR represents valuation that results from the set of reported ﬁnancial statement information.
Since ﬁnancial statement information is public and common to all investors, there is no subscript i in the val-
uation of that information.17 Yet, zR may still diﬀer from the true z (which is unobservable). We capture the
dispersion of the accounting information by the variance of zR. In contrast, non-accounting information ui
denotes investor i’s valuation of non-accounting information that he can access.18 The valuation component
ui could vary across diﬀerent investors depending on the access, interpretation ability and the eﬀort of the
investors.19 We denote dispersion in the valuation component based on non-accounting information by its
variance r2. We assume that the stock value expected across investors, E(Vi) is the expected stock market
price.
We focus on the relative weights, c1 and c2, that investors place on accounting and non-accounting valu-
ation, respectively. In this analysis, we assume that auditing could have two speciﬁc eﬀects on accounting
information and, therefore, on valuation: (i) to screen ﬁrms whose ﬁnancial reports are biased and/or unreli-
able by issuing qualiﬁed reports and (ii), to discipline the report production process and increase the precision
and unbiasedness of reported ﬁnancial statement numbers.20
We assume (without loss of generality) that when ﬁnancial statements are not qualiﬁed, investors do not
expect statements to be biased and attribute a high reliability to numbers reﬂected by a low variance of zR
which we denote by w21. However, when ﬁnancial statements are qualiﬁed, this signals to investors the possi-
bilities of bias and lower reliability in the reported accounting valuation zR, relative to unqualiﬁed reports. We
denote the perceived bias by the variable ‘a’ and the reduced perceived reliability21 of ﬁnancial statements by
an increased variance w22 > w
2
1. These notations are captured in the following expressions of probability den-
sity functions22:f ðzRjz; clean opinionÞ  f ðz;w21Þ; and;
f ðzRjz; qualified opinionÞ  f ðzþ a; w22Þ ðA3ÞFurther, if the ﬁrm is not audited, the lack of audit information adds an additional variance w23. We also
denote the prior probability of an unqualiﬁed report by p.ere is considerable recent literature that recognizes this diﬀerence between informed and relatively uninformed investors (Easley and
a, 2004; Brockman and Chung, 2003; Goel and Thakor, 2003; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996).
is possible for investors to use diﬀerent valuation functions to value common information and arrive at diﬀerent valuations.
atively, the diﬀerences in valuation function can also be viewed as diﬀerences in other information.
en though much of the non-accounting information might be available publicly, its interpretation by diﬀerent investors can be
nt. There is no common process like GAAP that guides the production and communication of non-accounting information. We seek
ture this aspect of non-accounting information in the model by the term ui.
assume the information risk to be common to all the investors, but diﬀerent for diﬀerent sources of information. In other words, we
e that all investors harbor the same degree of skepticism about accounting information; and that they share similar skepticism about
counting information, which could diﬀer from their skepticism about accounting information.
show later that either one of these audit eﬀects is suﬃcient to reduce the variance of the stock price (and returns) in the market.
is is the signaling eﬀect of auditing. While the bias and reliability of the numbers are not known, investors will assume that the bias
ck of reliability are at threshold levels that can be detected by an auditor after prescribed auditing practices. These threshold levels
for the bias and the increased variance w22.
ly the mean and the variance of the density function are shown in expressions (A3). This is not meant to imply that the density
n is fully deﬁned by the ﬁrst two moments.
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is given by23 Th
not chn2 ¼ pw21 þ ð1 pÞw22 þ pð1 pÞa2 þ w23 ðA4Þ
The investor optimally weighs the accounting and non-accounting sources of valuation information by a
minimum variance aggregation process (see Banker and Datar, 1989, for a theoretical basis for the aggrega-
tion process) by solving the following optimization problem23:Minimize
c1ui; c2ui
c21un
2 þ c22ur2 subject to c1u þ c2u ¼ 1 ðA5ÞIn the above expression, c1u is the weight placed on accounting information and c2u is the weight placed on
non-accounting information. The subscript ‘u’ denotes ‘non-audited’ ﬁnancial statements.
This yields optimal weightsc1u ¼
r2
r2 þ n2 and c2u ¼
n2
r2 þ n2 ðA6ÞWith the audit, the ﬁrm might get a clean opinion with probability p or a qualiﬁed opinion with a proba-
bility (1  p). The expected optimal weights will be as follows:c1a ¼
pr2
r2 þ w21
þ ð1 pÞr
2
r2 þ w22
" #
and c2a ¼
pw21
r2 þ w21
þ ð1 pÞw
2
2
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" #
ðA7ÞIn (A7), subscript 1 stands for weight on accounting information and subscript 2 for weight on non-
accounting information. Subscript ‘a’ denotes audited ﬁnancial statements.
An examination of (A6) and (A7) reveals that c1a > c1u and c2a < c2u. In eﬀect, audited ﬁnancial statement
numbers are weighted more than non-audited ones relative to the weighting of non-accounting information.
Step 2: Auditing reduces the variance in stock valuations by investors.
Heretofore, we have focused on one investor. We will now examine the divergence among investors. The
valuation of the stock by the ith investor is given by (A2):V i ¼ c1zR þ c2ui
The ﬁrst term is common to all investors. The second term consists of non-accounting information, which
could be diﬀerent for diﬀerent investors. When we take the variance of Vi across investors, we haveVariance ðV iÞ ¼ c22Variance ðuiÞ ðA8Þ
From step 1, we know that c2a < c2u. Therefore, from (A8) we see that the expected variance of the stock
values perceived by investors is less for audited ﬁrms than for non-audited ﬁrms, ceteris paribus.
Further, for a given market price of the previous period, (Pt1), the expected return on the stock is
given by (Vi  Pt1)/Pt1. The expected return will be equal to the market return. The expected variance
of the market return will be equal to ½Variance ðV iÞ=P 2t1. Therefore, we expect audited ﬁrms to have a
lower variance of market returns relative to non-audited ﬁrms. The diﬀerences in valuation by diﬀerent
investors also lead to a greater trading volume. Therefore, after we control for other determinants of trade
volume, we expect the trade volume for audited ﬁrms to be less than the expected trade volume for non-
audited ﬁrms.is problem is solved under the assumption that the two information sources do not covary with each other. Adding covariance does
ange results, but complicates the expressions. Therefore, we present the no covariance version.
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